For over two years, Yahya Sinwar and his top Hamas leaders secretly convened and devised a plan they anticipated would be the most devastating and destabilising attack on Israel in the group’s history. The Israeli military seized minutes of these clandestine meetings, which were obtained by The New York Times, providing a comprehensive account of the preparations for the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack.The documents also reveal Sinwar’s resolve to persuade Hamas’ allies, Iran and Hezbollah, to join the assault or at least commit to a broader confrontation with Israel.
The documents, verified by the Times, consist of minutes from 10 confidential planning sessions involving a select group of Hamas political and military leaders leading up to the October 7 attack. The minutes contain 30 pages of previously undisclosed information about the inner workings of Hamas’ leadership and the extensive preparations for the attack. The documents outline the main strategies and assessments of the leadership group, including the initial plan to carry out the attack in the fall of 2022, which was delayed as Hamas sought the participation of Iran and Hezbollah.
The Hamas leaders cited Israel’s “internal situation,” likely referring to the controversy surrounding Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu‘s plans to overhaul the judiciary, as one of the reasons they felt “compelled to move toward a strategic battle.” In July 2023, a high-ranking Hamas official travelled to Lebanon to meet with a senior Iranian commander, requesting assistance in striking sensitive sites at the beginning of the assault. The Iranian commander expressed support in principle but indicated that Iran and Hezbollah required more time to prepare.
The documents also mention Hamas’ intention to discuss the attack in greater detail with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, but do not specify whether the discussion took place. Hamas was confident in its allies’ general support but concluded that it might need to proceed without their full involvement, partly to prevent Israel from deploying an advanced new air defence system before the assault.
Hamas chose to launch an offensive in order to hinder the normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The group also sought to challenge Israel’s deepening occupation of the West Bank and its attempts to assert increased authority over the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem. These factors collectively influenced Hamas’ decision to engage in armed conflict.
The attack was seen as a means to disrupt the shifting geopolitical dynamics in the region, particularly the potential for improved relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Hamas aimed to resist Israel’s consolidation of control over the West Bank and its efforts to exert greater influence over the holy site in Jerusalem.
Hamas deliberately avoided major confrontations with Israel for two years from 2021 to maximise the surprise of the 2023 attack. The documents also reveal that Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip briefed Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ Qatar-based political leader, on “the big project,” a fact that was not previously known.
The documents provide a more comprehensive understanding of one of the most pivotal moments in modern Middle Eastern history, demonstrating that it was both the result of a long-term plan and a move influenced by specific events following Netanyahu’s return to power in Israel in late 2022.
The attack on Israel claimed approximately 1,200 lives and led to Israel’s bombardment and invasion of Gaza, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and militants. The conflict ultimately escalated into a broader war between Israel and Hamas’ regional allies.
The extent of Iran and Hezbollah’s knowledge of Hamas’ initial plans has been a persistent mystery surrounding the events of October 7. This question gained new significance in recent weeks, following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and Iran’s strikes on Israel.
While Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has publicly denied Iran’s involvement in the attack, and US officials have described intelligence indicating that key Iranian leaders were caught off guard, Hamas leaders have spoken broadly about the support they received from regional allies. There have also been scattered and sometimes conflicting reports of Iranian and Hezbollah officials assisting in the planning of the attack and training fighters.
The minutes were discovered on a computer by Israeli soldiers in late January as they searched an underground Hamas command centre in Khan Younis, from which the group’s leaders had recently escaped.
To assess the documents’ authenticity, the Times shared some of their contents with members of and experts close to Hamas. The Israeli military, in a separate internal report obtained by the Times, also concluded that the documents were genuine.